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USING ARBITRATION TO ELIMINATE 
CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS:  
EFFICIENT BUSINESS PRACTICE OR 
UNCONSCIONABLE ABUSE? 
JEAN R. STERNLIGHT* AND ELIZABETH J. JENSEN** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Companies are increasingly drafting arbitration clauses worded to prevent 
consumers from bringing class actions against them in either litigation or arbi-
tration.1  If one looks at the form contracts she receives regarding her credit 
card, cellular phone, land phone, insurance policies, mortgage, and so forth, 
most likely, the majority of those contracts include arbitration clauses, and 
many of those include prohibitions on class actions.2  Companies are seeking to 
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 1. See The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading Cases, Federal Statutes and Regulations, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 390, 410-20 (2003) (urging that courts be permitted to declare “no-class action arbitra-
tion clause[s]” to be unconscionable and that such analyses not be held preempted by the Federal Arbi-
tration Act).  One defender of the practice notes that evading class action liability may be one principal 
motivation of companies imposing arbitration.  See Carroll E. Neesemann, Should an Arbitration Pro-
vision Trump the Class Action?  Yes: Permitting Courts to Strike Bar on Class Actions in Otherwise 
Clean Clause Would Discourage Use of Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2002, at 13; see also 
Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 FRANCHISE L.J. 141 (1997) 
(urging franchisers to use arbitration to prevent class actions by franchisees); Alan S. Kaplinsky & 
Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me, But Who’s the Predator? Banks Can Use Arbitration Clauses as a Defense, 
BUS. L. TODAY, May/June 1998, at 24 (urging banks to use arbitration to prevent consumer class 
actions); Michael R. Pennington, Every Health Insurer’s Litigation Nightmare: A Case Study of How 
One Class Action Affected the Business of One Health Insurer, BRIEF, Summer 1999, at 46, 52 (noting 
that Alabama insurers are working to sustain the use of arbitration clauses in insurance policies to limit 
exposure to class actions); J.T. Westermeir, How Arbitration Clauses Can Help Avoid Class Action 
Damages: Strategies for Managing Risks of Litigation, COMPUTER L. STRATEGIST, Sept. 1997, at 1. 
 2. One study found that thirty percent of the arbitration clauses examined contained explicit class 
action prohibitions.  See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through 
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW &  CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 
65 (Winter/Spring 2004) (stating, in a study of arbitration clauses affecting the hypothetical average 
citizen in Los Angeles, that sixteen of the fifty-two arbitration clauses examined contained such a 
prohibition).  It is unclear whether clauses in California, a state that allows arbitral class actions, would 
be more or less likely to contain such prohibitions. 
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use these clauses to shield themselves from class action liability, either in court 
or in arbitration.3 
Companies’ attempts to avoid class action exposure through arbitration give 
rise to both legal and policy questions.  From a legal standpoint, is class action 
preclusion permitted under existing law, and if so, should it be?  While many 
courts have allowed companies to use arbitration clauses to elude class actions, 
an increasing number are striking such clauses as unconscionable.4  From a 
policy perspective, what should one make of companies’ attempts to use arbi-
tration clauses as a shield against class actions?5  Is this an efficient business 
practice that will benefit consumers in general, or is it an abuse of customers 
and the public at large?  Similarly, how should one view the courts’ regulation 
of class action prohibitions through the unconscionability doctrine?  Is case-by-
case analysis the best way to examine the legitimacy of this practice? 
This Article addresses these questions.  Part II examines courts’ reliance on 
the unconscionability doctrine to regulate the use of arbitration clauses to pre-
clude class actions.  Part III considers whether, from a policy perspective, com-
panies should be permitted to protect themselves against class actions in this 
way.  Specifically, it examines the economic argument that permitting compa-
nies to eliminate class actions benefits consumers at large by lowering prices, 
suggesting that such an analysis is incomplete and that good reasons support 
preserving the consumer class action.  Part IV discusses whether, assuming class 
actions should be protected, unconscionability claims are the best mechanism 
for determining which arbitration clauses are valid.  It argues that while the 
unconscionability doctrine offers some protections, case-by-case adjudication is 
a costly means of attacking class action prohibitions.  Thus, Part IV proposes 
that the interests of both public policy and efficiency would be better served by 
federal legislation prohibiting companies from precluding consumer class 
actions. 
 
 3. See supra note 1.  For examples of some of these clauses, see Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory 
Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive? 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 
6 n.5 (2000). 
 4. Although this Article focuses on unconscionability, it is also possible to attack a class action 
prohibition on the ground that it violates the federal statute under which the plaintiff’s claim is brought.  
See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 92-105.  Depending on the wording of the prohibition, it may also be 
possible to argue that it precludes class action arbitration, but not litigation, or vice versa.  In Califor-
nia, arbitral class actions are well accepted.  See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 
1982) (endorsing, albeit less than enthusiastically, the concept of classwide arbitration).  Further, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402 (2003), implicitly 
recognized the legitimacy of arbitral class actions.  Specifically, the Court remanded to the arbitrator 
the question whether, given the terms of the particular arbitration clause, an arbitral class action was 
permitted.  Id. at 2406-08; cf. Brennan v. ACE INA Holdings, Inc., No. 00-CV-2730, 2002 WL 1804918, 
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2002) (concluding that when an arbitration clause is silent on subject of class 
actions, it should be up to the arbitrator to determine whether the matter should proceed individually 
or as a class action). 
 5. For a short argument that this is bad policy, see Jean R. Sternlight, Should an Arbitration Pro-
vision Trump the Class Action? No: Permitting Companies to Skirt Class Actions Through Mandatory 
Arbitration Would Be Dangerous and Unwise, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2002, at 13. 
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II 
IS IT UNCONSCIONABLE TO USE ARBITRATION  
CLAUSES TO ELIMINATE CLASS ACTIONS? 
A. The Unconscionability Defense to Mandatory Arbitration 
While the Supreme Court views arbitration favorably, it has always made 
clear that unconscionable arbitration clauses should not be enforced.  Section 2 
of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that arbitration agreements 
“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”6  Throughout the pro-arbi-
tration era that commenced in the 1980s,7 the Court has emphasized that uncon-
scionability, along with other generally applicable contract defenses, is an 
appropriate ground for revoking an arbitration agreement.8  Similarly, the 
Court has frequently stated that it will compel arbitration of federal statutory 
claims only “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate his or 
her statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, such that the statute will con-
tinue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”9  Thus, in Green Tree 
Financial Corp. v. Randolph,10 the Court recognized that if it could be proven 
that a company had designed an arbitration process so costly that the consumer 
could not vindicate her rights, the arbitration clause imposing that process 
would not be enforced.11  While all the claims raised in the Supreme Court to 
 
 6. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
 7. For an examination of the development of the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration philosophy, see 
Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding 
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 644-74 (1996). 
 8. See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996) (“Generally applicable con-
tract defenses, such as . . . unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements.”); 
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (“States may regulate contracts, 
including arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles.”); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985) (“[C]ourts should remain attuned to well-supported 
claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power 
that would provide grounds ‘for the revocation of any contract.’”) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).  Until 
recently, it was assumed that unconscionability challenges would be made in court.  Several courts have 
recently held, however, that such challenges should be presented to the arbitrator.  See, e.g., Bob 
Schultz Motors, Inc. v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 334 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2003); Hawkins v. Aid Ass’n for 
Lutherans, 338 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2003).  While exploration of this issue exceeds the scope of this 
Article, these cases are wrongly decided; courts rather than arbitrators should decide unconscionability 
challenges.  For a consistent analysis, see Alexander v. Anthony Crane Int’l, 341 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
 9. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 
at 637) (brackets omitted).  In Mitsubishi, the Court had explained that arbitration clauses cannot be 
used to deprive individuals of their substantive rights: “We . . . note that in the event the choice-of-
forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue 
statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement 
as against public policy.”  473 U.S. at 637 n.19. 
 10. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 11. Id. at 92.  While the Court in Randolph found that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the 
arbitration process would be excessively costly, subsequent courts have applied the Randolph analysis 
to strike several clauses.  See, e.g., Phillips v. Assocs. Home Equity Servs., 179 F. Supp. 2d 840, 846 
(N.D. Ill. 2001) (holding an arbitration clause unenforceable as inconsistent with the Truth in Lending 
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date have involved federal statutory claims, there is no reason to believe that 
the Court would treat the use of arbitration to eliminate common law or state 
statutory claims any differently.12 
B. Class Action Prohibitions as Unconscionable 
Building on these principles, numerous courts have held that the inclusion of 
a class action prohibition in an arbitration clause may render that clause uncon-
scionable.13  Of these, the court in Ting v. AT&T14 focused most extensively on 
 
Act, on grounds of prohibitive cost, when the arbitration fees ranged from $750 to $5,000 per day and 
hardship was evinced by the borrower’s affidavit and the fact that the borrower was in the lender’s 
target “subprime” market); Camacho v. Holiday Homes, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 892, 897 (W.D. Va. 2001) 
(refusing to compel arbitration of a Truth in Lending Act claim on the basis of prohibitive cost to the 
consumer, when the consumer had “limited income” to pay administrative fees of $2,000, and even if a 
“rare” waiver of administrative fees were granted, the consumer would still likely be responsible for as 
much as $4,100 in arbitrator fees and expenses); Giordano v. Pep Boys–Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc., 2001 
WL 484360, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2001) (striking a provision of an arbitration clause requiring an 
employer and employee to share the arbitration costs of a Fair Labor Standards Act claim, when the 
employee earned $400 per week and would be responsible for $2,000 in arbitration fees). 
 12. Cf. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000) (concluding that a 
contract requiring employees to waive their rights to pursue sexual harassment or discrimination claims 
under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act in court is enforceable if the arbitration per-
mits employees to vindicate their statutory rights). 
 13. At the time one coauthor began writing about class actions and arbitration in 1998, no court 
had issued such a decision.  By the time she finished her first article on the subject, see Sternlight, supra 
note 3, three courts had determined that a class action prohibition contributed to an arbitration clause’s 
unconscionability.  Today, at least thirteen decisions from both federal and state courts have held either 
that a class action prohibition contained in an arbitration clause contributed to a finding that the clause 
was unconscionable or that the prohibition must be severed from the remainder of the clause due to its 
unfairness.  See Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 916, 934 (M.D. Tenn. 
2003); Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (concluding that a 
class action prohibition weighed heavily in favor of finding substantive unconscionabililty); Comb v. 
Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (voiding an arbitration clause as unconscionable on 
grounds that it permitted excessive arbitral fees, prevented plaintiffs from bringing a class action, and 
imposed a potentially costly venue requirement); ACORN v. Household Int’l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 
1160, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (voiding an arbitration clause, in part due to the manifest one-sidedness 
and unfairness of the class action prohibition); Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 
(holding an arbitration clause unconscionable, in part due to a class action prohibition), aff’d in relevant 
part, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 U.S. 53 (2003); Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, 
Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1104-05 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (same); In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 842 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ala. 1999) (refusing to enforce an arbitration clause imposed on a debtor, in part because it would 
prejudice the prosecution of the plaintiff’s claim as a class action); Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., No 
1010555, 2002 WL 31341084, at *8 (Ala. Oct. 18, 2002) (holding an arbitration clause unconscionable 
because it both limited the claimants’ prospective relief and precluded them from proceeding as a 
class); Mandel v. Household Bank Nat’l Ass’n (Nev.), 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380 (Ct. App. 2003) (severing a 
class action prohibition); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Ct. App. 2002) (severing a 
class action prohibition), cert. denied, 537 S. Ct. 1226 (2003); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 
576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (voiding an arbitration clause as unconscionable, in part because it pro-
hibited class actions); Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., No. 21522, 2004 WL 344135 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 
25, 2004) (holding a clause unconscionable based in part on its class action prohibition); State ex rel. 
Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002) (concluding that a class action prohibition contributed 
to the unconscionability of a clause); see also Lytle v. CitiFinancial Servs., Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 657-58 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (remanding to the trial court the question whether a class action prohibition was 
unconscionable and recognizing that the determination would turn on the evidence presented by the 
parties); Eastman v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., No. 01-1743, 2002 WL 1061856 (Wis. Ct. App. May 
29, 2002) (certifying the question whether an arbitration clause should be held unconscionable due to 
its class action prohibition). 
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the question.  In Ting, AT&T customers claimed AT&T violated California 
consumer protection laws by imposing new legal remedies provisions upon 
them through a revised consumer services agreement.  These provisions con-
tained an arbitration clause precluding customers’ use of class actions.15  The 
consumers argued that the new provisions were unconscionable.16 
The district court held the new provisions unconscionable, in part because of 
their class action prohibition.17  Having reviewed evidence regarding the kinds 
of lawsuits filed against AT&T and its competitors in recent years, the court 
found that “[i]t would not have been economically feasible to pursue the claims 
in these cases on an individual basis, whether . . . in court or in arbitration.”18  
Nor would “the lawyers who represented the plaintiffs in these cases . . . have 
taken them if the only claim they could have pursued was the claim of the indi-
vidual plaintiff.”19  The court found this worrisome not only because consumers 
would be left without the opportunity to obtain relief, but also because the 
company would be able to escape liability and, thus, would not be deterred 
from acting illegally.20 
The court rejected AT&T’s argument that enforcement by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) would be sufficient to protect consumers’ 
rights, finding as a matter of fact that such enforcement is unlikely.21  It also 
rejected “the only justification advanced for [the class action prohibition], that 
it will limit AT&T’s cost of litigation,”22 as insufficient to defeat numerous 
courts’ and legislatures’ findings as to the benefits of class actions.23  Labeling as 
“somewhat disingenuous” AT&T’s claim that it devised the new legal remedies 
provisions to give consumers a “broad range of options” and to avoid meritless 
suits,24 the court concluded that “AT&T’s principal purpose was [instead] to put 
 
 14. 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 15. Id. at 921. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 931. 
 18. Id. at 918. 
 19. Id.  The court explained, 
  The lawyer would almost certainly incur more in costs and time charges just getting the 
complaint prepared, filed and served than she would recover, even if the case were ultimately 
successful . . . .  While retaining counsel on an hourly basis is possible, in view of the small 
amounts involved, it would not make economic sense for an individual to retain an attorney to 
handle one of these cases on an hourly basis[,] and it is hard to see how any lawyer could 
advise a client to do so.  The net result is that cases . . . will not be prosecuted even if meritori-
ous. 
 Id. 
 20. Id. (“Thus, the prohibition on class action litigation functions as an effective deterrent to liti-
gating many types of claims involving rates, services or billing practices and, ultimately, would serve to 
shield AT&T from liability even in cases where it has violated the law.”). 
 21. Id. at 919.  The court based its conclusion on an examination of FCC reports for the previous 
ten years and on the FCC’s own statement that it “does not consider the award of damages to a class of 
individuals to be consistent with its consumer complaint procedures.”  Id.   
 22. Id. at 931. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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sufficient obstacles in the path of litigants to effectively deter many claims from 
being pursued.”25  Thus, the court held the class action ban substantively uncon-
scionable.26 
The Ting court explained that AT&T’s legal remedies clause was void, not 
because it required arbitration, but because it contained substantially unfair fea-
tures: 
Aware that the vast majority of service related disputes would be resolved informally, 
AT&T sought to shield itself from liability in the remaining disputes by imposing 
Legal Remedies Provisions that eliminate class actions, sharply curtail damages in 
cases of misrepresentation, fraud, and other intentional torts, cloak the arbitration 
process with secrecy and place significant financial hurdles in the path of a potential 
litigant.  It is not just that AT&T wants to litigate in the forum of its choice—
arbitration; it is that AT&T wants to make it very difficult for anyone to effectively 
vindicate her rights, even in that forum.  That is illegal and unconscionable and must 
be enjoined.27 
In Szetela v. Discover Bank,28 a second important case in this area, a card-
holder attempted to bring a class action against his credit card company alleging 
various unfair practices that caused cardholders to be charged fees for exceed-
ing their credit limits.29  When the trial court granted Discover’s motion to 
compel, the plaintiff was required to go to arbitration, individually, where he 
won an award of $29, the over-limit fee.30  He then appealed, seeking the oppor-
tunity to bring a class action, and claiming that the class action prohibition was 
unconscionable.31 
The court held that the class action prohibition was not only procedurally 
unconscionable, but substantively unconscionable as well.  The court empha-
sized that “[t]he manifest one-sidedness” of the provision was “blindingly obvi-
ous” because it could negatively affect only cardholders.32  The court then 
explained that the clause was intended to preclude customers with small claims 
from obtaining relief,33 thereby providing Discover with “virtual immunity” 
from class actions.”34  The court found this immunity troubling, not only because 
it was “harsh and unfair to Discover customers who might be owed a relatively 
small sum of money, but . . . also [because it] serves as a disincentive for 
 
 25. Id. at 920-21. 
 26. Id. at 931. 
 27. Id. at 938-39. 
 28. 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1226 (2003). 
 29. Id. at 865. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 866. 
 32. Id. at 867.  The court explained that “[a]lthough styled as a mutual prohibition on representa-
tive or class actions, it is difficult to envision the circumstances under which the provision might nega-
tively impact Discover [since] credit card companies typically do not sue their customers in class action 
lawsuits.”  Id. 
 33. Id. (“This provision is clearly meant to prevent customers, such as Szetela and those he seeks to 
represent, from seeking redress for relatively small amounts of money, such as the $29 sought by 
Szetela.”). 
 34. Id. at 867. 
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Discover to avoid the type of conduct that might lead to class action litigation in 
the first place.”35 
By imposing this clause on its customers, Discover has essentially granted itself a 
license to push the boundaries of good business practices to their furthest limits, fully 
aware that relatively few, if any, customers will seek legal remedies, and that any 
remedies obtained will only pertain to that single customer without collateral estoppel 
effect.  The potential for millions of customers to be overcharged small amounts with-
out an effective method of redress cannot be ignored.36 
The court also considered the class action prohibition problematic from a public 
policy perspective because it allowed litigants to contract away a procedural 
device—the class action—that serves the courts’ interest in efficiency.37  Having 
held the class action prohibition unconscionable, the Szetela court directed the 
trial court to strike the prohibition from the arbitration clause, 38 apparently 
intending that cardholders be required to arbitrate their claims but be allowed 
to bring arbitral class actions, which are permitted in California.39 
In two subsequent federal cases, ACORN v. Household International, Inc.40 
and Comb v. Paypal, Inc.,41 the Northern District of California followed the 
basic rationale of Szetela and concluded that a class action prohibition con-
tained in an arbitration clause was unconscionable.42  In ACORN, the court 
rejected the defendants’ argument that Szetela only applies in those 
jurisdictions that accept arbitral class actions.43  In Comb, the court similarly 
rejected the defendant’s argument that the FAA preempted the conclusion that 
 
 35. Id. at 868. 
 36. Id.  The court characterized the prohibition as “granting Discover a ‘get out of jail free’ card 
while compromising important consumer rights.”  Id. 
 37. Id. (“To allow litigants to contract away the court’s ability to use a procedural mechanism that 
benefits the court system as a whole is no more appropriate than contracting away the right to bring 
motions in limine, seek directed verdicts, or use other procedural devices that allow the courts to oper-
ate in an efficient manner.”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982) (endorsing, albeit less than 
enthusiastically, the concept of classwide arbitration).  For a discussion of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of classwide arbitration, see Sternlight, supra note 3, at 37-52. 
 40. 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 41. 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 42. Id. at 1176; ACORN, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 1173-74. 
 43. The defendants in ACORN asserted that, whereas California state courts may order arbitral 
class actions, federal courts may not, except when expressly permitted by the terms of the arbitration 
agreement.  In light of this purported distinction, they argued it would be inappropriate to find the class 
action prohibition unconscionable.  211 F. Supp. 2d at 1170-71.  The court found that the defendants 
had failed to establish that federal courts cannot order class-wide arbitration, id. at 1171 n.2, and that, 
even accepting that proposition, the defendants’ “subtle argument is ultimately unpersuasive” because 
it merges substantive unconscionability analysis with the analysis of proper remedy.  Id. at 1171.  “If 
federal courts are not permitted to order class-wide arbitration, then an alternative remedy must be 
devised to prevent enforcement of an unconscionable contract.”  Id. 
The defendants’ argument that federal courts cannot order classwide arbitration absent specific lan-
guage in the arbitration clause is based on McCarthy v. Providential Corp., No. C 94-0627 FMS, 1994 
WL 387852 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 1994).  See ACORN, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 1171 n.2.  For a critique of this 
position, see Sternlight, supra note 3, at 84-90. 
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the class action prohibition was unconscionable.44  Rather than merely severing 
the class action prohibition, both federal courts found it necessary to hold the 
entire arbitration clause unenforceable given its multiple unconscionable provi-
sions.45 
West Virginia’s Supreme Court, too, has held unconscionable an arbitration 
clause prohibiting class actions.  State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger46 involved a class 
claim brought against Friedman’s Jewelry by an individual who alleged that he 
and others had been deceived into purchasing unrequested insurance when 
buying jewelry at the store.  Mr. Dunlap paid $1.48 for credit life insurance and 
$6.96 for property insurance.47  On behalf of the class, he sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief, as well as various types of damages and attorneys’ fees.48  When 
Friedman’s sought to compel arbitration based on a contract Mr. Dunlap had 
signed, he argued that the arbitration provision was unconscionable,49 in part 
because it prohibited class actions.50 
The court accepted Dunlap’s argument that the class action prohibition was 
unconscionable.  Emphasizing that “[c]lass action relief—including the reme-
dies of damages, rescission, restitution, penalties, and injunction—is often at the 
core of the effective prosecution of consumer . . . cases,”51 the court recognized 
that the $8.46 Friedman’s added to Dunlap’s purchase price was “precisely the 
sort of small-dollar/high volume (alleged) illegality that class action claims and 
remedies are effective at addressing. . . .  In many cases, the availability of class 
action relief is a sine qua non to permit the adequate vindication of consumer 
 
 44. 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1175-76 (holding that while preemption would prevent California from 
adopting a statute that would prevent enforcement of arbitration covered by the FAA, ordinary state 
law doctrines such as unconscionability are not preempted); accord Mandel v. Household Bank, 129 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 386 (Ct. App. 2003).  Contra Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393, 
396 (Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that “where a valid arbitration agreement governed by the FAA pro-
hibits classwide arbitration, section 2 of the FAA preempts a state court from applying state substantive 
law to strike the class action waiver from the agreement.”), review granted, 65 P.3d 1285 (Cal. 2003).  In 
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, the court held: “If a state statute requiring a nonwaivable judicial 
forum for resolution of consumer disputes must give way to section 2 of the FAA, it necessarily must 
follow that a state judicial policy precluding class-wide arbitration waivers must also give way . . . .”  Id. 
at 343.  Further, “[w]hile a state may prohibit the contractual waiver of statutory consumer remedies, 
including the right to seek relief in a class action, such protections fall by the wayside when the waiver 
is contained in a validly formed arbitration agreement governed by the FAA.”  Id. at 346. 
 45. ACORN, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 1174; Comb, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1176.  In ACORN, the court wrote: 
“The interlocking nature of these hindrances indicates that the purpose of the arbitration agreement is 
not to transfer claims to a more expeditious forum but to deter Defendants’ customers from bringing 
claims.  As such, the agreement’s purpose is ‘tainted with illegality’ and severance is not appropriate.” 
211 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 (quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 696 
(Cal. 2000). 
 46. 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002). 
 47. Id. at 270. 
 48. Id. at 269. 
 49. Id. at 271. 
 50. Id. at 278-79. 
 51. Id. at 278. 
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rights.”52  The court considered class action preclusion problematic because it 
could enable companies to get away with illegal acts: 
Thus, in the contracts of adhesion that are so commonly involved in consumer and 
employment transactions, permitting the proponent of such a contract to include a 
provision that prevents an aggrieved party from pursuing class action relief would go a 
long way toward allowing those who commit illegal activity to go unpunished, unde-
terred, and unaccountable.53 
Not surprisingly, given this language, the court held the class action prohibition 
unconscionable.54  Rather than rewrite the arbitration clause to eliminate the 
class action exclusion and other problematic terms, the court felt bound to void 
the arbitration agreement altogether: 
[B]y tying substantively unconscionable exculpatory and limitation of liability provi-
sions to an arbitration provision in a form contract of adhesion, [Friedman’s] has 
sought to unilaterally use (one could say “misuse”) the honorable mechanism of arbi-
tration—[which] has found a respected place in the commercial life of our nation—as 
a scheme or mechanism to shield itself from legal accountability for misconduct. 
 Under such circumstances, we think a court doing equity should not undertake to 
sanitize any aspect of the unconscionable contractual attempt.55 
Other courts have employed similar reasoning in voiding class action prohi-
bitions as unconscionable.  For example, in Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley,56 a Florida 
appellate court stated: 
 The arbitration clause also effectively removes Powertel’s exposure to any remedy 
that could be pursued on behalf of a class of consumers. . . .  Class litigation provides 
the most economically feasible remedy for the kind of claim that has been asserted 
here. . . .  By requiring arbitration of all claims, Powertel has precluded the possibility 
that a group of its customers might join together to seek relief that would be impracti-
cal for any of them to obtain alone.57 
Similarly, in In re Knepp,58 a federal bankruptcy court explained: 
If this approach [allowing the preclusion of class actions] prevails, the pervasive use of 
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts could have the effect of eliminating class 
actions as an option available to aggrieved consumers.  If class actions are no longer 
an option, the vast majority of consumer claims involving relatively small sums of 
money on an individual basis will be left without a remedy.59 
While the discussion above may make it sound as though class action exclu-
sions are clearly unconscionable, numerous courts have enforced arbitration 
clauses containing class action prohibitions.60  In some of these cases, the plain-
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 278-79. 
 54. Id. at 280. 
 55. Id. at 284. 
 56. 743 So. 2d 570 (Bankr. Fla. App. 1999). 
 57. Id. at 576. 
 58. 229 B.R. 821 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999). 
 59. Id. at 842. 
 60. See, e.g., Lomax v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc’y, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (N.D. Ga. 
2002) (stating that the prohibition of class actions, without more, does not render an arbitration clause 
unconscionable); Lozano v. AT&T Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (refusing to find 
class action exclusion unconscionable and explaining that plaintiffs relinquish such “procedural nice-
ties” as class actions when they agree to arbitrate their claims).  Other cases enforcing arbitration 
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tiffs apparently failed to raise an unconscionability argument.  For example, in 
Johnson v. West Suburban Bank,61 the Third Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s 
argument that class action prohibitions are impermissible under certain federal 
statutes,62 but noted that it might have reached a different result if the plaintiff 
had been able to show that the arbitral forum selected was inadequate to vindi-
cate his statutory rights.63  Similarly, in Randolph v. Green Tree Financial 
Corp.,64 on remand from the Supreme Court,65 the Eleventh Circuit held that “a 
contractual provision to arbitrate [Truth in Lending Act (TILA)] claims is 
enforceable even if it precludes a plaintiff from utilizing class action procedures 
in vindicating statutory rights under TILA.”66  In neither case, however, did the 
plaintiffs claim that the prohibition was unconscionable.67 
In other cases, the plaintiffs have presented at least the outlines of an 
unconscionability argument, and that argument has been rejected.  For exam-
ple, in Pick v. Discover Financial Services, Inc.,68 the court refused to void an 
arbitration provision on the ground of class action preclusion, stating that “it is 
generally accepted that arbitration clauses are not unconscionable because they 
preclude class actions.”69 
Courts such as that in Pick often cite the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.70 to support the proposition that com-
panies are free to use arbitration to preclude class actions.  The Gilmer Court 
opined in dictum that 
even if the arbitration could not go forward as a class action or class relief could not be 
granted by the arbitrator, the fact that the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act] 
provides for the possibility of bringing a collective action does not mean that individ-
ual attempts at conciliation were intended to be barred.”71   
 
clauses prohibiting class actions are summarized in Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, 2001: An Arbi-
tration Odyssey, 57 BUS. LAW. 1287 (2002). 
 61. 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001). 
 62. Id. at 369.  The statutes at issue were the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000), and 
the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2000). 
 63. 225 F.3d at 373. 
 64. 244 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 65. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 66. 244 F.3d at 819. 
 67. For similar cases, see Arellano v. Household Fin. Corp. III, No. 01 C 2433, 2002 WL 221604 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2002); Rains v. Found. Health Sys. Life & Health, 23 P.3d 1249, 1253 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2001); Pyburn v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, 63 S.W.3d 351, 364 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 68. No. Civ.A 00-935-SLR, 2001 WL 1180278 (D. Del. Sept. 28, 2001). 
 69. Id. at *5 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991), and Johnson v. 
W. Suburban Bank, 223 F.3d 366, 377 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also Vigil v. Sears Nat’l Bank, 205 F. Supp. 2d 
566, 573 (E.D. La. 2002) (“[T]he fact that the clause implicitly waives . . . the ‘right’ to proceed by class 
action does not, in itself, render the clause unconscionable.”); AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 
S.W.3d 190, 200 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (“While there may be circumstances in which a prohibition on 
class treatment may rise to the level of fundamental unfairness, [the plaintiff’s] generalizations do not 
satisfy her burden to demonstrate that the arbitration provision is invalid here.”); cf. Forrest v. Verizon 
Communications, Inc., 802 A.2d 1007 (D.C. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a forum-selection clause 
resulting in the denial of class action—because state law did not permit class actions—was not uncon-
scionable or unreasonable given that the company’s principal place of business was in the forum state). 
 70. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 71. Id. at 32. 
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However, it is critical to recognize several limitations to this statement.  First, 
the Court found that the plaintiff had failed to show that class relief was 
unavailable, since the Court concluded that relevant New York Stock Exchange 
rules allowed for collective proceedings and that the EEOC could seek class-
wide relief.72  Second, Mr. Gilmer brought his suit individually, not as a class 
action.  Third, Mr. Gilmer did not try to argue that the class action prohibition 
was unconscionable.  Finally, it is simply not clear what the Court meant in 
stating that individual attempts at conciliation should not be barred. 
What, then, makes the difference as to whether a court will find a class 
action prohibition unconscionable?   
C. Good Arguments and Good Facts 
Claims that class action prohibitions are unconscionable depend on the 
same building blocks as most other legal claims: good arguments and good facts.  
When plaintiffs make only general assertions that a class action prohibition is 
unconscionable, their attack is likely to fail.73  But, if they can assemble the facts 
necessary to support some or all of the arguments set out, they have a good 
chance of success.74 
1. Individual Claims Would Not Be Financially Feasible 
The court decisions striking class action prohibitions have all emphasized 
that many small-dollar claims are simply not feasible if brought individually.75  
 
 72. Id. 
 73. See F. Paul Bland, Jr., Is That Arbitration Clause Unconscionable? PROVE IT!, CONSUMER 
ADVOC. (Nat’l Ass’n of Consumer Advocates, Washington, D.C.), July-Aug. 2002, at 1, 5 (observing 
that the one common thread in cases in which plaintiffs failed to show that class action prohibitions 
were unconscionable was “that the plaintiffs treated the cases principally as posing legal rather than 
factual issues”); James C. Sturdevant, The Critical Importance of Creating an Evidentiary Record to 
Prove that a Mandatory, Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clause is Unconscionable, FORUM, Oct. 2002, at 18 
(urging that attorneys seeking to defeat motions to compel arbitration engage in substantial discovery 
and seek to amass actual cases showing that the clause is illegal and unconscionable, rather than relying 
on purely legal arguments). 
 74. See Bland, supra note 73, at 1 (“Fighting a mandatory arbitration clause is not for the lazy, the 
meek, or those exclusively inclined to broad abstractions.  The key to success for a consumer advocate 
who wishes to avoid having her client forced into a particularly unfair arbitration system is both simple 
and difficult: one should put a powerful factual record before the court.”); see also Lytle v. CitiFinancial 
Servs. Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 664-665 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (recognizing that class action preclusion could 
be unconscionable, but ordering remand to permit the parties to present evidence an whether class 
action was needed to permit the plaintiffs to present their claims). 
To prevail on an unconscionability claim plaintiffs generally must demonstrate both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability.  See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 
669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (“The prevailing view is that [procedural and substantive unconscionability] must 
both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause 
under the doctrine of unconscionability.”).  While both requirements are significant, this Article 
focuses on substantive unconscionability because the proof necessary to establish procedural uncon-
scionability is no different for class action prohibitions than for other alleged flaws in arbitration 
clauses.  Paul Bland has discussed some of the proof plaintiffs’ counsel need to produce to establish 
procedural unconscionability.  See Bland, supra note 73, at 1-2; see also Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 
283 F.3d 595, 604-10 (3d Cir. 2002) (same). 
 75. See Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 918 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“It would not have been eco-
nomically feasible to pursue the [small-dollar] claims . . . on an individual basis, whether the case was 
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In essence, these cases recognize the point made by Professor Marc Galanter 
and others that by increasing plaintiffs’ transaction costs, defendants can induce 
them to accept lower settlements or even drop their claims altogether.76 Citing 
the Supreme Court’s oft-stated justification for supporting class actions,77 courts 
invalidating class action prohibitions explain that it is often not rational for 
individual consumers or attorneys to bring small claims,78 whether through liti-
gation or arbitration.79  At the same time, these courts have emphasized that a 
company that has perpetrated small-dollar illegal acts against numerous con-
sumers should not be permitted to escape liability simply because it would be 
irrational or impossible for any single individual to bring the claim.  Such an 
 
brought in court or in arbitration.”); In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 842 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999) (“If class 
actions are no longer an option, the vast majority of consumer claims involving relatively small sums of 
money on an individual basis will be left without a remedy.”); Leonard v. Terminix Int’l Co., 854 So. 2d 
529, 538 (Ala. 2002) (“The limitation upon recovery of ‘indirect, special, and consequential damages or 
loss of anticipated profits’ in the arbitration clause and elsewhere in the agreement and the preclusion 
of eligibility for class-action treatment by inserting a provision requiring arbitration deprive the Leo-
nards of a meaningful remedy and lead us to conclude that Terminix has extracted unreasonably favor-
able and patently unfair terms in its contract of adhesion.”); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
862, 868 (Ct. App. 2002) (“[The class action exclusion] is . . . harsh and unfair to Discover customers 
who might be owed a relatively small sum of money . . . . ”); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 
576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (“Class litigation provides the most economically feasible remedy for the 
kind of claim that has been asserted here.  The potential claims are too small to litigate individually, but 
collectively they might amount to a large sum of money.”); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 
265, 278 (W. Va. 2002) (stating that the plaintiff’s claim of $8.46 in added insurance charges “is pre-
cisely the sort of small-dollar/high volume (alleged) illegality that class action claims and remedies are 
effective at addressing”). 
 76. See Marc S. Galanter, The Quality of Settlements, 1988 J. DISP. RESOL. 55, 70-72 (arguing that 
one party can encourage a settlement that would not otherwise have been desirable by imposing high 
transaction costs on the other); Lisa B. Bingham, Control Over Dispute System-Design and Mandatory 
Commercial Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 232-39 (Winter/Spring 2004) (explaining 
that by controlling dispute-system design, one party can impose transaction costs on the other, thereby 
dramatically altering the available settlement range or making it no longer cost effective for the 
opposing party to bring a claim).  Eliminating the possibility of class actions is but one of many ways of 
increasing plaintiffs’ transaction costs.  See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 7, at 682-83 (discussing 
additional mechanisms, such as imposing high arbitral fees and selecting a distant forum). 
 77. See, e.g., Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338-39 (1980) (noting that class 
actions make it possible to bring claims that would otherwise be infeasible); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacque-
lin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (stating that absent a class action, “[n]o competent attorney would under-
take [the petitioner’s] action to recover so inconsequential an amount”). 
 78. See, e.g., Leonard, 2002 WL 31341084, at *5, *8 (showing that the plaintiffs, who claimed less 
than $500, would face fees and costs in arbitration substantially higher than the amount claimed); Pow-
ertel, 743 So. 2d at 576 (“The potential claims are too small to litigate individually, but collectively they 
might amount to a large sum of money.”); Dunlap, 567 S.E.2d at 278. 
 79. See, e.g., Ting, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 918.  The Ting court observed that most claims against AT&T 
for less than $1,000 are likely to be handled by customer service representatives, rather than through 
either litigation or arbitration.  Id. at 917. 
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enforcement gap would lead to unjust enrichment80 and the failure to deter ille-
gal conduct.81 
Plaintiffs are most successful when they can support their assertions factu-
ally, rather than ask courts to assume that all small claims are infeasible if 
brought individually.  Testimony from parties, local attorneys, or experts can 
establish which claims plaintiffs and their attorneys deem worth bringing.  Such 
testimony needs to be specific as to what kinds of damages and attorneys’ fees 
would be available for individual claims, why these are insufficient, whether 
joinder of claims is permitted under the arbitration clause, and, if so, why join-
der would not cure the problem.  If, as is sometimes true, the arbitration clause 
would permit plaintiffs to litigate claims that are small enough to qualify for 
small claims court, plaintiffs will need to show as well why that remedy is insuf-
ficient.82 
The Ting83 litigation illustrates some of the kinds of evidence plaintiffs can 
use to support their claims that a class action prohibition is unconscionable 
because individual claims are infeasible.  The plaintiffs used discovery to 
determine the nature of suits that had been brought against AT&T and its com-
petitors in the past,84 “contact[ing] more than a dozen attorneys who had 
previously brought class actions against AT&T to learn about their cases.”85  
When virtually all those attorneys stated they would be willing to testify “that 
they would not have been able to pursue the claims at issue in those cases—
even if the claims were valid—if they were unable to proceed on a class basis,”86 
AT&T “stipulated to what they would have said rather than face this litany of 
damaging testimony.”87  The plaintiffs’ counsel also “introduced testimony from 
three experts on the subject of whether counsel could be found to bring such 
 
 80. See, e.g., id. at 918 (“[T]he prohibition on class action litigation . . . would serve to shield AT&T 
from liability even in cases where it has violated the law.”); Eastman v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 
No. 01-1743, 2002 WL 1061856, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. May 29, 2002) (“Because each individual plaintiff 
suffered less than $200 actual damage, the cost and inconvenience of separate actions would result in no 
recovery for most plaintiffs and substantial unjust enrichment to Conseco, assuming the plaintiffs’ 
claims have merit.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“PayPal appears to 
be attempting to insulate itself contractually from any meaningful challenge to its alleged practices.”); 
Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Ct. App. 2002) (explaining that the clause “serves 
as a disincentive for Discover to avoid the type of conduct that might lead to class action litigation,” 
essentially granting Discover “a license to push the boundaries of good business practices to their fur-
thest limits”); Powertel, 743 So. 2d at 576 (“The prospect of class litigation ordinarily has some deter-
rent effect on a manufacturer or service provider, but that is absent here.”). 
 82. They might show, for example, that it would be infeasible for an individual plaintiff to obtain 
representation for a small claims matter, to succeed on a pro se basis, to obtain sufficient discovery to 
prevail in small claims court, or to obtain needed injunctive relief from a small claims court. 
 83. 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 84. See Bland, supra note 73, at 5; see also Ting, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 915, 917 (summarizing the evi-
dence); Sturdevant, supra note 73, at 19 (observing that Ting plaintiffs took “[d]ocumentary and depo-
sition discovery as to class action litigation . . . that [had] been filed against AT&T”). 
 85. E-mail from Paul Bland, Esq., Staff Attorney, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, to Jean R. 
Sternlight (July 29, 2002, 07:05 CST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bland E-mail]. 
 86. Bland, supra note 73, at 5. 
 87. Id. at 5. 
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cases on an individual basis.”88  Each testified that most if not all consumers with 
such claims would have been unable to “find competent counsel to handle their 
claims . . . , in or out of arbitration, even if their claims were entirely valid.”89  
On the basis of this evidence, the court found that the lawyers who represented 
plaintiffs in class actions against AT&T and its competitors would not have 
handled those cases as individual matters.90  The plaintiffs also presented 
evidence that legal aid programs would not likely have the resources to take 
such cases.91  The court observed that the defendant, in contrast, “did not 
produce any testimony from any practicing lawyer, or any other evidence, that 
any of the cases [previously filed] . . . would be economically feasible to litigate” 
under AT&T’s consumer services agreement.92 
Depending on the stage at which they are presenting proof, plaintiffs may 
also be able to rely on expert affidavits.  For example, Edward Sherman, an 
eminent professor of complex litigation, opined in an affidavit that a suit, which 
alleged that the defendants’ “payday loan” interest rates violated the Indiana 
loansharking statute, was 
a “negative value suit,” that is, a suit in which the potential recovery to any individual 
would be too small and the costs of litigation too large to have an adequate incentive 
to litigate individually.  Consumer class actions are often negative value suits and have 
a much stronger claim for class action treatment than would [a dispute arising under] a 
contract between two corporations or well-heeled parties in which there is an arbitra-
tion clause. . . .  Some consumers may do the same kind of calculus as do attorneys in 
judging that the recovery in a case may not justify the time and expense of pursuing a 
remedy through litigation or arbitration.93 
2. Individual Claims Would Not Be Feasible Due to a Lack of Information 
as to the Merits of the Claim or the Nature of Arbitration 
As Professor Sherman has noted, often consumers do not know that a 
potential defendant’s conduct is illegal.94  When they are being charged an 
excessive interest rate or a penalty for check bouncing, for example, few know 
or even sense that their rights are being violated.  Nor, given the relatively small 
amounts at stake, would most consumers find it worthwhile to seek legal advice 
to determine whether this is the case.  As a Wisconsin appellate court 
 
 88. Bland E-mail, supra note 85. 
 89. Bland, supra note 73, at 5; accord Sturdevant, supra note 73, at 20 (noting that three experi-
enced consumer attorneys “testified as experts that virtually all consumers with statutory claims would 
not have been able to locate competent counsel to represent their interests in the absence of a certified 
class action, even if their claims had a high likelihood of success”) 
 90. Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 918 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (stating that this evidence was 
“undisputed”). 
 91. Id. at 919 (citing testimony from a consumer attorney). 
 92. Id.  The court recognized that the defendant had presented “some conclusory contradiction 
from one of defendant’s experts, Professor Priest, which I did not find convincing inasmuch as he does 
not practice in this area and his conclusions were largely unsupported by any evidence.”  Id. 
 93. Aff. of Professor Edward F. Sherman ¶ 8, Sullivan v. QC Fin. Servs. Inc. (No. 82D03-0003-CP-
738) (Vanderburgh Super. Ct., Ind.) (on file with author). 
 94. Id. ¶ 9(a). 
STERNLIGHT_GLOBAL(COPY).DOC 10/14/2004  10:25 AM 
Winter/Spring 2004] CLASS ACTION PRECLUSION 89 
explained, “[u]nless class action is authorized, many plaintiffs will be unaware 
of the allegedly illegal activities and will not commence any proceedings.”95 
One of the virtues of the class action is that it requires that putative class 
members be notified of the potential violation of their rights.96  Once notified, 
class members can typically opt in or out of the class, depending on how the suit 
has been structured.97  Thus, whereas lack of information as to the existence of a 
possible claim will prevent most consumers from filing individual claims in arbi-
tration or litigation, a single informed consumer can help initiate a class action 
that might help many others. 
Lack of information as to how to file a claim may also be important.  Con-
sumers may well be unsure how to file an individual claim in either litigation or 
arbitration.  And those with claims too small to attract an attorney to represent 
them on a contingent fee basis face a formidable barrier to bringing a claim.  
Moreover, to the extent that a consumer realizes that she is required to bring 
her claim in arbitration, lack of understanding or even misunderstandings of 
that process may deter her from filing a claim.98 
 
 95. Eastman v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., No. 01-1743, 2002 WL 1061856, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. 
May 29, 2002). 
 96. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2), (d)(2).  Although notice is only required for those class 
actions certified under Rule 23(b)(3), courts are free to give notice in other cases and often do.  See 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.21 (1995) (observing that notice, while required for 
(b)(3) class actions, may be advisable at times for (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions as well); HERBERT 
NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, §§ 8.01-8.45 (1992) (detailing the notice 
requirements for class action suits). 
 97. With respect to those claims brought under Rule 23(b)(3), class members must be afforded the 
right to opt out.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 96, at § 
30.231.  This right need not be afforded for claims brought under Rules 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2).  See 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 96, at §30.14. 
 98. Professor Sherman has made precisely these points: 
  a.  Even consumers who have a feeling that there is something wrong with their contract or 
its performance by the other side are rarely willing or able to take the necessary steps to 
invoke arbitration and follow it through effectively to the end.  This is especially true of the 
putative “payday loan” class members in this case who, by virtue of the kind of loan they took 
out, are probably financially strapped.  Although a consumer can pursue arbitration without a 
lawyer, he or she would be at a disadvantage and might well lack basic information about how 
to initiate such a proceeding and how to proceed effectively at various stages.  Of course, such 
persons would be under a similar disadvantage as to filing individual suits, but the class action 
provides a means for them to obtain redress by simply not opting out and letting the represen-
tative plaintiff and class attorneys bear the responsibility and cost of proceeding in the inter-
ests of the class. 
  b.  Consumers may also fail to invoke arbitration because of lack of knowledge or distrust 
of the process.  This is especially true of “payday loan” borrowers who are often unsophisti-
cated concerning legal matters and may be hesitant to devote the time and expense to arbitra-
tion.  Most citizens are aware that the courts provide an impartial tribunal for resolution of 
legal matters and a jury of one’s peers.  To the extent that they have heard anything about 
arbitration, it may be negative, casting doubts upon it as the best vehicle for an individual to 
vindicate rights against large corporations or institutions.  Of course, there are also serious 
doubts in our society about the efficacy of the court system, especially if one must hire his own 
attorney to pursue litigation, but the class action provides a feasible alternative for the impe-
cunious consumer.  Individual arbitration is less attractive than class action treatment regard-
ing attorneys fees and costs.  In an arbitration, the consumer would have to pay his own attor-
neys and investigation/preparation costs, while attorneys fees in a class action are generally 
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Thus, the class action not only provides financial feasibility through com-
bining small claims but also surmounts deterrents to the filing of claims caused 
by the average consumer’s lack of information.  When companies prohibit class 
actions, they greatly decrease the likelihood that any claims will be filed against 
them. 
3. Even If Individual Suits Were Feasible, They Would Not Result In Full 
Enforcement of the Law 
The federal court in Ting pointed out another critical aspect of class actions: 
Many types of relief can be afforded only on a group basis.  The Ting court 
examined the kinds of claims that had been filed against AT&T: 
 In 2000, AT&T was named as a defendant in 59 consumer long distance suits filed in 
other courts (not small claims courts) nationwide.  It appears that the principal types 
of claims which members of the class can expect to litigate outside small claims court 
are not individual billing disputes or disputes about poor service, but claims of inten-
tional misconduct, such as discrimination or harassment in the course of providing 
service, credit reporting problems and problems relating to identity theft and claims 
that involve practices or problems that pertain to all or a group of consumers.  Exam-
ples of group claims include complaints about the way AT&T is measuring the length 
of a call or complaints that AT&T has misrepresented the terms of a calling plan in its 
advertising.  If a consumer complains about such a practice, AT&T can try to satisfy 
the consumer by making a billing adjustment, but it cannot change its practice as to 
only that consumer without being considered discriminatory under the FCC’s stan-
dards.  In other words, if AT&T decided on an informal basis to measure the length of 
one class member’s phone calls a certain way, it would be discriminating in violation of 
the [Federal Communications Act] if it measured the calls of other similarly situated 
class members differently.99 
In short, even if an individual were to successfully arbitrate a claim against 
AT&T, it is highly unlikely that the arbitrator could order the kind of declara-
tory or injunctive relief that would put a stop to a widespread illegal practice. 
Some might argue that several successful suits for individual relief might 
lead a company to change its overall policy; in fact, it is not at all obvious that 
this is true.  A company may find it worthwhile to pay off a few individual 
claims but keep its overall policy.  This is, in effect, a form of price discrimina-
tion that offers a lower price to those very few customers who are enterprising 
enough to complain about an illegal policy.100  When the individual claims are 
arbitrated rather than litigated, it is even less likely that they will lead to com-
pany-wide reform.  Unlike public litigation, which can lead to widespread pub-
 
not payable unless the class prevails and then are generally authorized by the court out of the 
recovery to the class at large. 
Aff. of Professor Edward F. Sherman ¶ 9, Sullivan v. QC Fin. Servs. Inc. (No. 82D03-0003-CP-738) 
(Vanderburgh Super. Ct., Ind.). 
 99. Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 915 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 100. DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 290-
312 (4th ed. 2005).  Carlton and Perloff’s discussion of the use of coupons and rebates highlights this 
point.  They note that using cents-off coupons or offering rebates allows companies to price discrimi-
nate.  Only some consumers—those who put a relatively low value on their time, for example—will 
take the time to collect, sort, and use coupons or send in the wrappers required for a rebate.  Id. at 292.  
Similarly, only some consumers will have the expertise and time to pursue individual claims. 
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licity based on even a small individual claim, the arbitration process is typically 
private.  Jounalists cannot usually read and report on arbitration claims as they 
do complaints filed in court. 
Thus, to the extent that class actions are eliminated, many types of relief 
simply will not be available.  Whereas an individual consumer might be able to 
recover the excessive twenty-dollar check-bouncing charge that was levied 
against her, she could not, through either litigation or arbitration, obtain an 
order requiring the company to change its policy. 
Once again, plaintiffs who seek to void a class action prohibition should not 
present this argument in the abstract, but should gather specific evidence, as did 
the Ting plaintiffs, regarding the types of claims that can and cannot effectively 
be prosecuted individually.101 
4. Administrative Enforcement Actions Would Not Be an Adequate Sub-
stitute for the Class Action 
In multiple cases, companies have attempted to fight the claim that class 
action preclusion is unconscionable by arguing that various government agen-
cies are available to defend the group rights of consumers and others.  For 
example, in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph,102 the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce urged as amicus curiae, “[E]nforcement of arbitration agreements 
for TILA claims will have no effect on the powerful deterrent force of agency 
and criminal enforcement mechanisms provided by TILA.  These enforcement 
mechanisms make class actions unnecessary to ensure a high level of TILA 
compliance.”103  Similarly, in Ting, AT&T argued that a class action was not 
needed because the FCC could adequately protect consumers’ rights.104  At a 
minimum, one cannot help but see such arguments as ironic, given that the 
attorneys and firms charged with defending their corporate clients are often 
critics of the government agencies that they are now praising.105 
 
 101. See Plaintiffs’ Statement Re: Discovery, Ting v. AT&T, Case No. C 0129696 BZ ADR (Aug 29, 
2001) (on file with author) (describing document and deposition discovery sought from AT&T); Bland, 
supra note 73, at 5 (discussing interviews with attorneys who had sued AT&T); Bland E-mail, supra 
note 85 (same). 
 102. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 103. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioners at *18, Randolph (No. 99-1235), available at 2000 WL 744157. 
 104. 182 F. Supp. 2d at 919 (discussing AT&T’s position that consumer claims should be presented 
to the FCC). 
 105. For example, in EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002), various business organizations 
argued that an employee’s agreement to arbitrate should prevent the EEOC from seeking monetary 
damages on that individual’s behalf.  See Brief of Amici Curiae Associated Industries of Massachusetts, 
Connecticut Business and Industry Association, and New England Legal Foundation in Support of 
Respondent at *4, Waffle House (No. 99-1823), available at 2001 WL 799187.  If this position had pre-
vailed, the EEOC’s ability to protect the rights of those employees required to arbitrate claims indi-
vidually would have been tightly constrained.  Fortunately, however, a six-to-three majority of the 
Court refused to allow companies to use arbitration to escape this government regulation.  See 534 U.S. 
at 312. 
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The Ting plaintiffs presented facts related to actual FCC activity that con-
vinced the court that governmental enforcement actions could not take the 
place of class actions.  The court found that, “in a variety of contexts,” 
the FCC is not a forum before which a class member can effectively vindicate her right 
to recover damages from AT&T. . . .  Nor is the FCC an effective forum for a class of 
similarly situated consumers seeking to recover damages from AT&T for a classwide 
practice without each consumer having to file an individual complaint . . . .106 
This conclusion—that the FCC could not be relied on to enforce consumers’ 
rights—was critical to the court’s holding that AT&T’s class action prohibition 
was unconscionable. 
III 
BUT, ARE CLASS ACTION PROHIBITIONS EFFICIENT? 
It can be argued that, for the reasons outlined above, class actions are bene-
ficial to consumers, and class action exclusions must therefore be detrimental.  
Professor Stephen Ware, however, legitimately points out that a fair analysis of 
class exclusions would be more complex.107  In particular, he suggests that the 
gains companies make by prohibiting class actions may be passed on to con-
 
 106. 182 F. Supp. 2d at 920.  The Ting court explained its findings as follows: 
  A review of FCC reports for the past ten years discloses that until recent years there are 
very few reports of FCC decisions involving a complaint by an individual consumer against a 
long distance carrier.  Most of the complaints in recent years have concerned “slamming,” the 
unauthorized substitution of a consumer’s preferred long distance carrier for another without 
proper consent.  It was largely undisputed at trial that it took the FCC approximately seven-
teen years before it effectively responded to “slamming” complaints. 
  In recent years, in response to consumers’ complaints, the FCC has initiated investigations 
which ultimately resulted in changes in telephone company practices and in the imposition of 
forfeitures, or the payment of “voluntary contributions” to the United States Treasury.  At 
defendant’s request, I took judicial notice of 14 orders of the FCC adopting consent decrees or 
imposing forfeitures or notices of apparent liability, all of which issued during the year 2000.  
With the exception of In the Matter of MCI WorldCom Communications, Inc., 15 F.C.C.R. 12, 
181 (2000), in which the FCC approved a mechanism for providing some credit to certain con-
sumers adversely impacted by the company’s practices, see id. at 12, 182, the FCC does not 
appear to have concerned itself with obtaining individual relief for the complainants, even in 
situations where the FCC has concluded the carrier committed an “egregious” practice. 
  . . . . 
  This is not surprising, since the FCC has stated that it does not consider the award of dam-
ages to a class of individuals to be consistent with its consumer complaint procedures. . . .  Nor 
have I seen a single report of the FCC addressing a consumer complaint for an intentional tort 
allegedly committed by a carrier . . . . 
Id. at 919-20. 
 107. See Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration 
Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89 [hereinafter Ware, Paying the Price]; see also Christopher R. Dra-
hozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 771-72 (suggesting that there may be rea-
sons, such as lower prices or higher payments, that rational persons or businesses would agree to 
seemingly unfair arbitration); STEPHEN J. WARE, ARBITRATION UNDER ASSAULT: TRIAL LAWYERS 
LEAD THE CHARGE (Cato Inst., Policy Analysis No. 433, 2002), at 6, 9 [hereinafter WARE, 
ARBITRATION UNDER ASSAULT], available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-433es.html (urging that 
bills prohibiting mandatory arbitration would likely harm consumers, in that mandatory arbitration 
makes dispute resolution more accessible to most consumers and “almost certainly lowers prices”). 
STERNLIGHT_GLOBAL(COPY).DOC 10/14/2004  10:25 AM 
Winter/Spring 2004] CLASS ACTION PRECLUSION 93 
sumers108 and that as a society we might be better off allowing companies to 
engage in this strategy.109  “Attempts to make arbitration more favorable (or 
‘fair’) to consumers have a downside for consumers if the effect of those 
attempts is to raise businesses’ arbitration costs.”110  As to class actions in par-
ticular, Ware argues that cases “requiring that arbitration preserve the class 
action[] raise the cost of arbitration to businesses and, therefore, raise prices to 
consumers.”111  While Ware does not insist that companies must be allowed to 
eliminate class actions, he does urge that policymakers consider the effect on 
prices in determining how much leeway to afford companies.112 
Professor Ware’s argument, however, is incomplete.  While it is certainly 
true as a matter of economic theory that all of a company’s savings may be 
passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices, it is also true that they may 
not.  The former, Panglossian event occurs only to the extent that the require-
ments of perfect competition are met.113 
Four market characteristics are critical to define perfect competition: 
(1)  There should be a sufficient number of small buyers and sellers such that no single 
buyer nor seller can influence the market price.  No seller should produce a large per-
centage of the total market output. 
(2)  The good or service produced should be homogeneous, so that no firm produces a 
unique product. 
(3)  Entry and exit into the market should be very easy.  No significant barriers to 
entry should exist such as licenses, economies of scale, high capital setup costs, or 
brand loyalty. 
 
 108. It is interesting to consider why companies apparently prefer to be sued individually rather 
than in class actions—that is, why eliminating class actions is a “gain” for a company.  If a company 
engaged in no illegal conduct, would it not often be quicker and cheaper for the company to establish 
the validity of its conduct, once and for all, in a class action?  On the other hand, if the company in fact 
engaged in illegal conduct, it is easier to see why a class action would be more costly than arbitration. 
The class device allows multiple claimants who might well have been deterred by the arbitral require-
ment to bring successful claims.  Perhaps the most efficient and cost-effective solution is for companies 
to obey the law. 
 109. To support this argument, Professor Ware cites economic theory.  He explains that “[i]n a 
market economy, characterized by freedom of entry and exit,” if any company is earning an excessive 
profit, other companies will enter that market and begin competing by selling the goods or services at a 
lower price.  This, argues Ware, will cause prices to fall and benefit consumers.  Ware, Paying the Price, 
supra note 107, at 91-92 (citing JAMES D. GWARTNEY & RICHARD L. STROUP, ECONOMICS: PRIVATE 
AND PUBLIC CHOICE 532-39, 563-65, 595-98 (7th ed. 1995)). 
 110. Id. at 93; see also WARE, ARBITRATION UNDER ASSAULT, supra note 107, at 9-10 (arguing, 
more generally, that mandatory arbitration is beneficial for most consumers, for businesses, and for 
society as a whole, and that it is only plaintiffs’ lawyers and consumers who hope to bring large cases 
who will be harmed); cf. Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to 
the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 735, 741 (2001) (recognizing that 
the extent to which costs imposed on employers by statute will be borne by employers, employees, and 
consumers “is determined by the elasticity of supply and demand in the ultimate product markets, and 
in the markets for the factors of production, labor and capital”). 
 111. Ware, Paying the Price, supra note 107, at 94. 
 112. Id. at 99. 
 113. It is clear that Ware is thinking of price reductions resulting from cost-savings in a competitive 
market.  He states, “Assuming that consumer arbitration agreements lower the dispute-resolution costs 
of businesses that use them, competition will (over time) force these businesses to pass their cost-
savings to consumers.”  Id. at 91. 
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(4)  All buyers and sellers should have very good access to relevant information such 
as prices, quality and characteristics of goods, and costs of production.114 
Are these conditions likely to be met in the real world, where companies are 
mandating arbitration and eliminating class actions?  First, think again about 
phone companies, credit card companies, banks, and insurance companies.  
While there are many small purchasers of these services, the number of produc-
ers is definitely limited.  For example, of the over 6,000 banks and nonbank 
holding companies that issue credit cards, only around fifty do so nationally.  In 
the period from 1989 to 1994, only ten companies held approximately sixty per-
cent of total outstanding credit card balances.115  And in banking, the ten largest 
banks held almost thirty-seven percent of total deposits nationally in 1998, an 
increase of roughly seventeen percentage points since 1990.116  In such markets, 
it is far from clear that no single seller can influence market prices.117 
Second, these companies’ products are not entirely homogeneous.  Rather, 
these companies attempt to distinguish themselves based on interest rates, types 
of service, and similar characteristics.  Consumers will not necessarily drop one 
credit card, bank, insurer, or phone company at will to pick up another.  There 
are differences among these products, and costs to making the switch.  Switch-
ing banks, for example, results in significant costs, such as those associated with 
opening and closing accounts and making arrangements for direct deposits.  
Switching phones may result in the consumer being charged substantial fees.118 
Third, as Professor Ware notes, his argument is entirely dependent on free 
entry and exit from the market.119  When access to the market is impeded, as by 
a monopoly or cartel, companies are able to keep their profits.120  High capital 
investment requirements, lack of information, and other barriers to entry may 
 
 114. See WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 
401-02 (7th ed. 1998); ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 252-53 (5th 
ed. 2001). 
 115. Victor Stango, Competition and Pricing in the Credit Card Market, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 499, 
500 (2000). 
 116. Steven J. Pilloff, Commercial Banking, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 224, 237 
(Walter Adams & James Brock eds., 10th ed. 2001).  For further evidence on the banking industry, see 
Special Issue, Industrial Organization Topics in Banking, 12 REV. INDUST. ORG. (Stephen A. Rhoades 
ed., 1997). 
 117. For evidence that the largest health insurance firms control a significant share of the market, 
see, for example, Roger Feldman et al., HMO Consolidations: How National Mergers Affect Local 
Markets, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 1999, at 96-104; see also Stephen E.  Foreman et al., Monopoly, 
Monopsony and Contestability in Health Insurance: A Study of Blue Cross Plans, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 
662 (1996). 
 118. For evidence that consumers do not regard one company’s credit card as a perfect substitute 
for another’s, and that there are costs to switching, see Paul S. Calem & Loretta J. Mester, Consumer 
Behavior and the Stickiness of Credit Card Interest Rates, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1327, 1327-36 (1995).  
Economists call the phenomenon of firms within a market producing similar but distinctive products 
“product differentiation.”  For introductory discussions, see JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & CARL E. WALSH, 
PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 251-53 (3d ed. 2002); RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., 
MICROECONOMICS 254-56 (12th ed. 1999).   
 119. Ware, Paying the Price, supra note 107, at 91 (assuming “a market economy, characterized by 
freedom of entry and exit”). 
 120. LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 118, at 236-37. 
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make it difficult or impossible for new companies to enter particular markets.121  
With local phone service, for example, both government regulations and capital 
outlay requirements substantially limit access to the field.  In fact, entry barriers 
in local telephone service have been characterized as “formidable.”122  In bank-
ing, lack of information about local businesses and residents can constitute a 
serious barrier to entry since unfamiliarity with local conditions makes risk 
evaluation difficult.123 
In sum, economic theory alone raises significant doubts that companies pass 
on to consumers the entire cost-savings from using arbitration clauses to elimi-
nate class actions.124  It is not surprising that, to date, no published studies show 
that the imposition of mandatory arbitration leads to lower prices. 
Also, as Professor Ware recognizes, low prices neither are, nor necessarily 
should be, policymakers’ primary concern.125  Many government regulations 
clearly increase companies’ costs, and these regulations may even increase 
prices, but policymakers have determined that these regulations make sense 
nonetheless.126  For example, we require manufacturers of tires, drugs, and cars 
to meet minimum standards to protect public health and safety.  Congress has 
now passed legislation geared to ensuring that businesses are honest in their 
accounting practices.127  Will such rules lead to higher prices?  Perhaps.  But 
Congress has determined that any such costs are well worthwhile to protect 
investors and the public from fraudulent activity. 
Further, Professor Ware does not sufficiently acknowledge the distributive 
aspects of his argument.  Even assuming that permitting companies to eliminate 
 
 121. LIPSEY ET AL., supra note 118, at 236-37, 266-69; STIGLITZ & WALSH, supra note 118, at 258. 
 122. Manley R. Irwin & James McConnaughey, Telecommunications, in THE STRUCTURE OF 
AMERICAN INDUSTRY, supra note 116, at 308.  One objective of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
47 U.S.C. §§ 251-61 (2000), was to increase competition at the local level by introducing competitive 
local exchange carriers (CLECs).  But these alternative local service providers have had only a minimal 
effect on the market share of local monopolies, primarily the regional Bell operating companies.  See 
Irwin & McConnaughey, supra, at 309-11. 
 123. Pilloff, supra note 116, at 234.  For a summary of evidence that markups on credit cards 
remained high even as credit card interest rates fell, suggesting that the market was not perfectly com-
petitive, see Stango, supra note 115, at 500-01 
 124. Suppose the market is imperfectly competitive, even monopolistic.  What guidance does eco-
nomic theory offer as to whether cost-savings will be passed on to consumers in the form of lower 
prices?  Not surprisingly, the answer is less clear than it is in a competitive market.  The extent to which 
cost-savings by a monopoly will be transferred to consumers depends heavily on the elasticity of the 
market demand curve and on the shape of the firm’s marginal cost curve.  See HAL R. VARIAN, 
INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 420-25 (6th ed. 2003). 
 125. See Ware, Paying the Price, supra note 107, at 90, 99 (recognizing that regulation may yield 
benefits that outweigh any costs); see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Privatizing Civil Justice: Commer-
cial Arbitration and the Civil Justice System, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 578, 587-88 (2000) (noting a 
tradeoff between the costs and benefits of regulating arbitration). 
 126. As noted earlier, see supra note 108, it is interesting to consider when and why it would be less 
expensive for companies to be sued in numerous individual suits rather than in a single class action.  
Whereas a company that has broken the law may find it preferable to avoid class liability, a company 
that has committed no illegal acts may be better off establishing its lack of liability, once and for all, in a 
class action.  That is, the elimination of class actions may be particularly important to those companies 
that act illegally. 
 127. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
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class actions would cause prices of phone service or credit or insurance to drop 
slightly, how should this be weighed against the cost to the individual consumers 
who find themselves unable to vindicate their rights?  Those consumers may 
well feel that any small gains for the group as a whole do not warrant their indi-
vidual losses.  Moreover, given the informed choice, many consumers might be 
willing to pay a slightly higher price to preserve their right to litigate a class 
action.128  In economic terms, the lower price situation may not be Pareto-opti-
mal.129 
Moreover, even if, in return for a lower price, informed consumers might 
gamble that they would not need to litigate, policymakers might still be justified 
in prohibiting the elimination of class actions.  Regulation is sometimes appro-
priate to protect individuals from their own irrational actions if such actions 
might fail to serve their best interests.130  In particular, psychologists have shown 
 
 128. Professor Ware has recognized and attempted to counter this argument.  See Stephen J. Ware, 
Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & 
Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 212-13 n.95 (1998).  However, his arguments are not compelling.  
First, he asserts that it is improper to consider what consumers “would have” agreed to, since contract 
law ought to focus on what they did actually agree to.  Second, he urges that courts cannot easily 
determine what consumers “would have” agreed to.  Third, he urges it is no more appropriate to 
equalize information than to equalize any other property.  Id.  In essence, the difference between 
Ware’s position and our own is that we believe in the propriety of government regulation, and he does 
not.  The question is precisely whether contracts ought to be enforced if they would not have been 
entered into by persons possessing full information.  While Ware is correct that courts cannot easily 
determine on a case-by-case basis what individual consumers would have agreed to, courts can and fre-
quently do determine what a reasonable person would have done.  Moreover, this Article urges 
legislative action rather than such individualized determinations.  It is perfectly appropriate for legisla-
tures to take steps to correct informational inequities and to redistribute wealth and income in appro-
priate circumstances. 
As a thought experiment, one might put consumers behind a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance.”  See 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971).  Would such consumers, unsure whether they 
might have the desire to sue a company in a class action to eliminate illegal practices, be willing to trade 
that opportunity for a slightly reduced price?  Clearly, companies have not been willing to give con-
sumers the choice because, in the vast majority of situations, companies do not permit consumers to 
choose whether they would prefer arbitration to litigation.  Advocates of mandatory arbitration have 
consistently argued that it is not practical to afford consumers such a genuine choice on either a predis-
pute or post-dispute basis.  See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate 
over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559 (2001) 
(arguing that it is not practical to permit employees to choose between arbitration and litigation on a 
post-dispute basis). 
 129. Although Professor Ware is correct in his insistence that perfect information on the part of 
consumers is not necessary to ensure that price reductions are passed along to consumers, Paying the 
Price, supra note 107, at 92, an efficient solution cannot be achieved without such perfect information, 
see STIGLITZ & WALSH, supra note 118, at 232-35, 287-301. 
 130. The recently emerged field referred to as “behavioral law and economics” or “law and behav-
ioral science” attempts to modify standard economic assumptions with psychological insights.  See gen-
erally BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Christine Jolls et al., A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Symposium, The Legal 
Implications of Psychology: Human Behavior, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1497 (1998); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of 
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
1051 (2000).  For a critique of this new discipline, see Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too 
Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1907 (2002). 
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that individuals often behave in an irrational but predictable fashion.131  They 
tend to be overoptimistic, so they might undervalue the cost of giving up their 
right to sue.132  Similarly, individuals are not necessarily risk-neutral, but rather 
may take irrational gambles on prospective losses;133 they are often risk-seeking 
with respect to moderate-to-high probability losses and risk-averse with respect 
to low probability losses.134  Thus, even assuming an informed consumer would 
accept a binding arbitration provision excluding class actions in return for a 
slightly lower price, policymakers might well determine that it would be inap-
propriate to allow companies to impose such a restriction on consumers.135  This 
is particularly true if one accepts the argument of Professors Hanson and Kysar 
that companies will inevitably seek to take advantage of consumers’ irrational 
behavior by manipulating the market.136  Similarly, Professor Korobkin has 
 
 131. The word “irrational,” as used here, denotes that individuals’ expressed preferences may not 
make sense from a mathematical-probabilistic standpoint.  See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 130, at 
1144 (explaining that their identifying behavior that deviates from what rational choice theory would 
predict does not equate to a claim that people are generally irrational).  For a summary of some 
common irrational behaviors, see Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation: 
Using Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 269, 306-13 (1999). 
 132. See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 130, at 1541-43 (explaining that individuals’ inability to accu-
rately assess risks may undermine the “consumer sovereignty” arguments against paternalism and gov-
ernment regulation).  Of course, it is also true that government bureaucrats and politicians may them-
selves be affected by irrational biases.  Id. at 1543-45; see also Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some 
Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, 
supra note 130, at 325-54 (recognizing that politicians may be influenced by voters’ expressed prefer-
ences, even if they recognize those preferences as irrational). 
 133. Cognitive psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Twersky developed this widely accepted 
account of decisionmaking, which is known as “prospect theory.”  See Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); see 
also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decision, 59 J. BUS. 251 
(1986); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
 134. Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 
165-67 (2000).  It is unclear whether a well-informed consumer would view the risk of being required to 
take a dispute to arbitration as low, moderate, or high.  It is also unclear how the informed consumer 
would calculate the expected value of such a risk—that is, how harmful they would think it would be to 
forego the opportunity to litigate.  But, one can say with some confidence that individuals would not 
typically be able to evaluate these probabilities in a rational, risk-neutral fashion, and this can provide a 
justification for regulation. 
 135. Of course, the mere possibility of these irrationality phenomena should not be used to justify 
regulation any more than the assumptions of perfect competition should be used to oppose regulation.  
Ideally, policymakers would empirically investigate the need for regulation in this area.  Where the 
necessarily empirical work has not been done, however, policymakers have no choice but to rely on 
their intuition and instincts.  Unfortunately, as noted earlier, policymakers may themselves be affected 
by these same biases, and may also be influenced by voters’ irrational preferences.  See Noll & Krier, 
supra note 132, at 325-54.  Nevertheless, regulation does afford at least an opportunity to protect con-
sumers and others from their own irrationality. 
 136. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of 
Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1425 (1999) (drawing on a case study of the tobacco 
industry to argue that “because a multitude of nonrational factors influence individual decisionmaking, 
consumers cannot be expected to engage in efficient product purchasing analyses—regardless of 
whether manufacturers are required to supply product warnings”); Hanson & Kysar, supra note 130, at 
747 (“Manufacturers, to survive, must behave ‘as if’ they are attempting to manipulate consumer risk 
perceptions.  And in light of the immense power of the market forces driving these attempts, it seems 
highly doubtful that manufacturer strategies (be they deliberate or accidental) will fail.”) (emphasis 
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recently argued that because consumers typically behave with only bounded 
rationality, companies that draft form contracts have an incentive to slant con-
tractual terms in their direction, whether or not those terms would be 
efficient.137 
At least one corporate defendant has tried a version of Professor Ware’s 
argument that lower prices would be passed on to consumers, but the court did 
not find it persuasive.  In Ting v. AT&T, the district court stated: 
AT&T has suggested that if its costs are lower, it can charge less.  It presented no evi-
dence that the Legal Remedies Provisions would produce lower charges . . . .  Nor am 
I prepared to make that assumption, since while lower costs can produce lower 
charges, they can also produce higher profits.  In any event, the notion that it is to the 
public’s advantage that companies be relieved of legal liability for their wrongdoing so 
that they can lower their cost of doing business is contrary to a century of consumer 
protection laws.138 
As the Ting court notes, one of the problems with Professor Ware’s argument is 
that it could be used to support elimination of all forms of government regula-
tion.  In this era of Enron and WorldCom, this is quite a hard sell. 
In considering whether it is appropriate to permit companies to use arbitra-
tion clauses to eliminate class actions, policymakers should also be cognizant of 
the important role that private litigation plays in the U.S. legal system.  
Whereas some countries choose to enforce their laws by establishing large and 
powerful government bureaucracies, the United States has generally taken a 
different approach.  Although the United States does have government agen-
cies devoted to protecting the rights of consumers and others, these tend to be 
on a small scale compared to those of other nations, such as many European 
countries.139  Instead, the United States relies on affected individuals bringing 
their own lawsuits and calls them private attorneys general.  In such a system, 
the elimination of class actions is far more worrisome than it would be in a 
 
added).  While Hanson and Kysar focus on manufacturers’ potential use of packaging, manufacture, 
and marketing to take advantage of consumers’ irrationalities, the same analysis could be applied to the 
manner of providing an arbitration provision.  Indeed, discovery conducted in the Ting litigation 
showed that AT&T spent substantial resources determining how best to implement their binding arbi-
tration policy so that it would not be opposed by consumers.  See Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 
911-13 (N.D. Cal. 2002).  In short, merely requiring companies to provide accurate and visible descrip-
tions of their arbitration requirements will not be sufficient to protect consumers from unfair arbitra-
tion provisions. 
 137. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003). 
 138. Ting, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 931 n.16. 
 139. See Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call 
for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1263 (2001) (“The American justice system substantially relies 
upon private enforcement to help define and explain regulatory legislation and to insure that it is 
enforced.”); Christopher R. Drahozal & Raymond J. Friel, Consumer Arbitration in the European 
Union and the United States, 28 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 357 (2002) (noting that European coun-
tries take a more regulatory approach to consumer law than does the United States).  For a general 
discussion of some of the institutional differences between U.S. and European approaches to consumer 
law, see A. Brooke Overby, An Institutional Analysis of Consumer Law, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
1219 (2001). 
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system in which well-financed government bureaucracies also protect consum-
ers’ rights.140 
Considering these policy arguments, absent any empirical proof that allow-
ing companies to eliminate class actions would serve the best interests of con-
sumers, the only reasonable conclusion is that the practice of allowing U.S. 
companies to use arbitration clauses to insulate themselves from class action 
liability is problematic.  At minimum, this practice should be subject to regula-
tion. 
IV 
THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
Assuming that policymakers determine that companies should not have an 
unrestricted license to eliminate class actions, the question becomes how best to 
regulate this practice.  As Professor Ware notes,141 the current approach requires 
prospective class plaintiffs to argue, on a case-by-case basis, that the prohibition 
in a particular contract is unconscionable or otherwise illegal.142  Faced with 
these arguments, courts are reaching disparate conclusions.  Some are refusing 
to address the unconscionability question at all, instead referring the issue to 
the arbitrators.143  Some are voiding arbitration clauses that prohibit class 
actions,144 some are severing that portion of the clause,145 and many others are 
upholding such clauses.146  As noted earlier, plaintiffs’ challenges are most likely 
to succeed when they are based upon a substantial factual record.147 
Are individual court challenges a satisfactory way to regulate class action 
preclusion?  Some might say “yes,” arguing that mandatory arbitration should 
 
 140. European Union countries, in addition to using various government agencies to protect con-
sumers’ rights, have also prohibited companies from imposing mandatory arbitration on consumers.  
See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, Annex 1(q), 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29; see also Council Directive 
93/13/EEC, art. 1(1), 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29; Commission Recommendation 98/257/EC, art. 1-7, 1998 O.J. 
(L 115) 31.  For a discussion of how mandatory arbitration is treated outside the United States, see Jean 
R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb?, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 831 (2002). 
 141. Ware, Paying the Price, supra note 107, at 89 (“Courts regulate consumer arbitration by 
enforcing arbitration clauses that have certain features, while refusing to enforce arbitration clauses 
that lack those features.”). 
 142. The primary argument plaintiffs have made, in addition to unconscionability, is that the use of 
an arbitration clause to eliminate class actions violates the federal statute under which their claim is 
brought.  For a discussion of this argument, see Sternlight, supra note 3, at 93-105.  The argument 
remains available and has prevailed in at least one case.  See Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 
F. Supp. 2d 1087 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (finding an arbitration clause unenforceable because it violates the 
Truth in Lending Act).  Most courts, however, have rejected the argument that the Truth in Lending 
Act guarantees a right to proceed by class action.  See, e.g., Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 
(3d Cir. 2000); Hale v. First U.S.A. Bank, N.A., No. 00 Civ. 5406, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8045 (S.D.N.Y 
Jun. 19, 2001); Lloyd v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., No. 00-109-SLR, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8279 (D. Del. 
Feb 22, 2001). 
 143. See supra note 8. 
 144. See supra note 13. 
 145. See Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867-68 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 146. See supra note 60. 
 147. See supra notes 73-74. 
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be permitted unless it has been proven unfair.148  The Supreme Court has inter-
preted existing law to require this result, holding in such cases as Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.149 and Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph150 
that the employee or consumer bears the burden of showing that an arbitration 
clause should be voided on statutory or common law grounds.151 
While placing the burden of proof on the challenger may sound reasonable 
at first blush, it fails to take into consideration the costs and logistical realities of 
challenging an arbitration clause.  For instance, in Ting, the plaintiffs were able 
to convince the court to throw out the arbitration clause only because they con-
ducted extensive discovery and presented large quantities of factual information 
at trial.  The plaintiffs’ attorneys spent more than 2,000 hours on the pretrial, 
trial, and immediate post-trial portions of the case,152 an investment worth over 
$400,000 using an hourly rate of just $200 per hour.  The defendants, in 
responding to these challenges, similarly expended large sums amassing their 
facts for trial.  One of the plaintiffs’ attorneys, Paul Bland, notes that “[a]t one 
point we counted that AT&T and [the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA)] between them had at least 17 lawyers enter appearances or engage in 
discovery battles in the case.”153  Because the costs of challenging a class action 
prohibition are very high, many plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys likely opt not 
 
 148. See Estreicher, supra note 128; see also Neesemann, supra note 1 (arguing that arbitration 
clauses that are otherwise fair should not be voided merely for containing class action prohibitions). 
 149. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 150. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 151. See, e.g., Randolph, 531 U.S. at 92 (“[W]here . . . a party seeks to invalidate an arbitration 
agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden 
of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.”); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (stating that the party seek-
ing to avoid arbitration of statutory claims bears the burden of establishing that Congress intended to 
preclude arbitration of the claims at issue); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985) (“Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the 
agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would 
provide grounds for the revocation of any contract.”) (quotations omitted).  For examples of how this 
presumption affects class action unconscionability challenges, see Adkins v. Labor Ready Inc., 303 F.3d 
496 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that the plaintiff had failed to meet his burden of proof of showing that a 
class actions prohibition would render litigation under the Fair Labor Standards Act prohibitively 
expensive); Lytle v. CitiFinancial Servs., Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 666 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (stating that the 
plaintiffs cannot go forward without presenting evidence showing that they cannot feasibly present 
their claims individually). 
In Randolph, four dissenting justices recognized the significance of the majority’s holding and sug-
gested that it is not necessarily appropriate to place the burden of proving the inaccessibility of the arbi-
tral forum on the challenger merely because the challenger has traditionally been required to bear the 
burden of showing that arbitral remedies are inadequate.  531 U.S. at 93-96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
The dissenting justices further observed that a repeat-player defendant may be in a better position to 
make a showing regarding the costs of arbitration. 
 152. See Time Reports from Sturdevant Law Firm and Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, Chart 2 
(reflecting hours expended on the Ting litigation from May 2001 to February 25, 2002) (on file with 
authors); Bland E-mail, supra note 85 (stating that the plaintiffs’ attorneys “put in well over 2,000 hours 
of lawyer time during the trial phase” of the suit); cf. Sturdevant, supra note 73 (describing substantial 
discovery undertaken by the plaintiffs’ attorneys).  The time records from Ting reflect hundreds of 
additional hours expended by paralegals and law clerks. 
 153. Bland E-mail, supra note 85.  The AAA became involved in the suit because it was the 
designated service provider. 
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to even mount such attacks154—not because they lack merit, but simply because 
they are not economically feasible, given the cost, the likelihood of success, and 
the likely payoff.155 
Policymakers should take into account the difficulty of court challenges as 
they decide how to handle companies’ attempts to use arbitration clauses to 
eliminate consumer class actions.  On the one hand, it might appear that courts 
can adequately protect the class action using existing law, such as the uncon-
scionability doctrine.156  The case-by-case approach allows courts to distinguish 
between those class action prohibitions that substantially limit plaintiffs’ ability 
to bring claims and those that do not.157  This may seem fair and appropriate.  
On the other hand, putting the unconscionability doctrine to use comes at a 
high cost.  To enable courts to distinguish between those class action prohibi-
tions that are and are not unconscionable, both plaintiffs and defendants must 
expend significant time and money.  Plaintiffs win class action exclusion chal-
lenges only when they can present substantial evidence that the arguments 
made in Part II of this Article—for example, that individual suits are not feasi-
ble or that government enforcement is not effective—apply to the facts of their 
particular case.158  Plaintiffs’ costs deter many challenges, and defendants’ costs 
may well cause the price of their products or services to rise for all consumers.159 
An alternative to using a case-by-case approach would be for Congress to 
prohibit companies from using arbitration clauses to preclude class actions.  If 
Congress thought such a general prohibition too broad, it could at least prohibit 
the practice with respect to arbitration agreements imposed on consumers or 
employees.160  Such a legislative approach would have both costs and benefits.  
Its primary advantage would be substantially reducing the cost of challenging 
class action prohibitions, but it would also serve other interests that are fur-
thered by class actions, including the courts’ interest in the efficient resolution 
 
 154. Ting was brought as a collaborative effort by San Francisco attorney Jim Sturdevant and the 
public interest firm Trial Lawyers for Public Justice.  The latter has devoted substantial resources to 
fighting mandatory arbitration throughout the country, and likely did not take on this suit as a profit-
making venture.  See Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, at http://www.tlpj.org (last visited Mar. 5, 2004). 
 155. Economists refer to the costs associated with negotiating, reaching, and enforcing contracts as 
transaction costs.  See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF 
CAPITALISM (1985) (giving an overview of transaction-cost economics and its behavioral assumptions 
and discussing the implications of transaction costs for topics as diverse as the structure of firms, con-
tract relations, and antitrust law); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in HANDBOOK 
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 135-82 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989); Oliver 
Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1989). 
 156. Sternlight, supra note 3, at 121 (“[C]ourts can adequately protect the policies underlying both 
class actions and arbitration using existing case law.”). 
 157. As Professor Sternlight has noted previously, “[p]laintiffs who have large claims or who are 
independently wealthy might be less successful in using the unconscionability argument [to challenge a 
class action prohibition] than would be poorer plaintiffs with smaller claims.”  Id. at 107. 
 158. See supra Part II.C. 
 159. See Ware, Paying the Price, supra note 107, at 94. 
 160. The securities industry typically requires individual claims to be arbitrated but allows class 
actions to be litigated.  See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 45-49. 
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of disputes and the public’s interest in ensuring that the law is enforced.161  
Under the current system, in which class action prohibitions can be defeated 
only if challenged in court, these broader interests are often ignored. 
Admittedly, it can also be argued that class actions are detrimental, not only 
to defendants but to the court system and to the public at large.  Academics as 
well as corporate interests have pointed to ethical and efficiency issues and have 
urged that class actions be limited or reformed, if not eliminated.162  To date, 
however, having weighed these arguments, Congress has determined that the 
benefits of class actions outweigh any costs.  Class actions remain a crucial ele-
ment of federal and state rules of civil procedure and of the U.S. legal system.  
While legislation is being considered that would further regulate class actions, 
no one has seriously proposed wholesale elimination of this important proce-
dural device.163  Many, including those representing consumers, have recognized 
that class actions can be abused.164  Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, for exam-
ple, runs a “class action abuse prevention project—just as it runs a project to 
oppose mandatory arbitration.”165  However, to recognize that the use of class 
actions must be reasonably constrained is not to say that companies should be 
able to “self-deregulate” by giving themselves complete immunity from class 
actions. 
Although the focus here has been on legislation that might be enacted by 
the U.S. Congress, state legislatures might separately prohibit companies from 
proscribing the use of class actions.  While it is clear that state legislation unfa-
vorably targeting arbitration will be preempted by the Federal Arbitration 
Act,166 it is not evident that state efforts to protect class actions would be void.  
First, such legislation would not need to focus on arbitration alone; states might 
well choose to prohibit companies from precluding class actions in either litiga-
tion or arbitration.  Second, state legislation that prohibited companies from 
using arbitration clauses to preclude class action would not eliminate but rather 
regulate arbitration.167  As the Supreme Court has now implicitly recognized, 
arbitral class actions are viable procedural devices.168  Thus, state legislation that 
 
 161. See Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867-868 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 162. For a summary of some of the criticisms of class actions, see Sternlight, supra note 3, at 34-37. 
 163. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. (2003) (amending the pro-
cedures that apply to the certification of interstate class actions). 
 164. See, e.g., Brian Wolfman, Forward: The National Association of Consumer Advocates’ Stan-
dards and Guidelines for Litigating and Settling Class Actions, 176 F.R.D. 370, 370-74 (1998). 
 165. Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, at http://www.tlpj.org (last visited Mar. 5, 2004). 
 166. See Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996). 
 167. For a fuller discussion of the preemption issue, see Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of 
Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 35-38 (2003) (arguing that 
state constitutional jury-trial requirements are not preempted); see also David S. Schwartz, Correcting 
Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (Winter/Spring 2004).  
 168. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2404 (2003) (holding that the arbitrator should 
determine whether an ambiguous clause allows arbitral class action); see also Brennan v. ACE INA 
Holdings, Inc., No. 00-CV-2730, 2002 WL 1804918, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2002) (stating that an arbi-
trator should be free to certify a class action); Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1208 (Cal. 
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protects the right to proceed by class action should not be held preempted by 
the Federal Arbitration Act. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Companies are increasingly using arbitral class action prohibitions to insu-
late themselves from class action liability.  These prohibitions are detrimental 
not only to potential class members but to the public at large in that they are 
preventing the law from being adequately enforced.  In essence, by precluding 
class actions, companies are engaging in “do-it-yourself tort reform,” freeing 
themselves from liability without having to convince legislatures to change the 
substantive law.169  The unconscionability defense, while sometimes successful, is 
itself too expensive and unwieldy to adequately regulate companies’ attempts to 
elude class action liability.  Thus, as a matter of fairness, efficiency, and justice, 
Congress should prevent companies from exempting themselves from class 
action liability. 
 
 
1982) (recognizing the possibility of classwide arbitration); Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 
596 A.2d 860 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (recognizing the possibility of arbitral class action). 
 169. This phrase was coined in an attack on the practice of using arbitration to eliminate class 
actions.  See Sternlight, supra note 3, at 11.  Paul D. Carrington has employed a similar phrase: “self-
deregulation.”  See Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361 (2002).  
While one commentator has suggested that do-it-yourself tort reform is commendable, see Roger S. 
Haydock, The Supreme Court Creates Real Civil Justice Reform, 9 Metropolitan Corporate Counsel # 
11 (Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Mountainside, NJ), Nov. 2001, at 45, the legislature, not individ-
ual companies, should determine whether those companies should be allowed to avoid the strictures of 
substantive law. 
